The Song of Absence: Blanchot and Kristeva on Loss, Melancholy, and Imagination by Hanly, Peter
The Song of Absence: 
Blanchot and Kristeva on Loss, Melancholy, and Imagination 
Peter Hanly 
 
 ‘Even then his trembling tongue invok'd his bride; 
With his last voice, “Eurydice”, he cry'd, 
“Eurydice”, the rocks and river-banks reply'd.' 
  
Orpheus sings the loss of Eurydice. He sings her absence, and the voice 
of that absence stirs the shades of Hell, stills the roar of animals, and 
moves the very rocks to pity. The song of Orpheus is the dream of a 
poetic diction, of a singing, whose intensity lifts it beyond the crowded 
complacency of the everyday to uncover a cadence that disrupts the 
monotonous churning of the world. A song that will force itself even 
upon the obdurate inaccessibility of stone: such is the dream that has 
carried the voice of Orpheus beyond the banks of the river Hebrus to 
echo across the shores of our own turgid and difficult times. That the 
force of this singing is born of the articulation of an absence – out of 
pain, out of loss – must render this image of special significance in any 
speculation on the relations of absence to imagination, of sorrow to 
song, of melancholy to the libidinal economies of artistic expression. It 
is with a view to exploring some of these connections that this paper is 
written. It will move from a discussion of Blanchot's dense and cryptic 
reflection on the myth of Orpheus from his 1955 volume ‘L'Espace 
Litteraire', to the exploration of a parallel theoretical moment in the idea 








‘Allas! Whanne Orpheus and his wyf weren almest at the termes of the 
nyght (that is to seyn, at the laste boundes of helle), Orpheus looked 
abakward on Erudyce his wyf, and lost hire, and was deed.' 
  
Blanchot's essay ‘Le Regard d'Orphée' is a meditation on the bringing to 
visibility of absence, as it belongs to the act of writing. Engaging with 
the complex metaphoric interplays of light and dark, of ascent and 
descent, as they weave through all aspects of the myth, Blanchot centers 
his writing on the idea of loss . Not, however, the initial loss of 
Eurydice, nor the desperate journey of recovery, nor still the 
overwhelming power of the Orphic lament: instead, his focus is on the 
second loss – on the moment, introduced late into the Western mythic 
legacy by Virgil, of Orpheus' turn, his gaze . Whether interpreted as 
love-madness, as impatience, as doubt, or as forgetfulness, the turning of 
Orpheus has come down to us as an irruption of human failure into a 
narrative of loss and recovery, the curiously inexplicable quality of the 
act echoing the arbitrary rhythms of choice and their consequence. 
Saturated with regret, the image of Orpheus' transgression - his second 
loss - has, since Virgil, helped to measure out the geometries of love and 
betrayal, of hope and loss, of trust and doubt that determine the rhythms 
of our self-narration, and to raise to the level of mythic inevitability the 
coil of our uncertainties. 
Blanchot sees it as his task to re-inscribe Orpheus' failure into a context 
which would locate the loss not merely within the litanies of human 
inadequacy, but as a choice whose paradoxical necessity lies at the heart 
of the process of writing. To some degree, this involves reviving an 
allegorical reading of the myth, which would interpret both Eurydice and 
Orpheus as symbolically complementary aspects of a search for higher 
Truth. In the Neoplatonic symbolology of Boethius, for example, 
Orpheus represents nous, and Eurydice epithumia , and Orpheus' journey 
the struggle, within the individual, between appetite and aspiration. On 
this reading, the turning back of Orpheus would represent a cautionary 
failure, a regressive lapse occasioned by identification with the 
corporeal. ‘For whoso that evere be so overcomen', as Chaucer's 
luminous Middle-English translation has it, ‘that he ficche his eien into 
the put of helle,...al that evere he hath drawen of the noble good he lesith 
it.' 
For Blanchot, too, Orpheus and Eurydice also represent : they belong, in 
other words, to an allegorical order which places them in relation to each 
other as aspects of a universalized struggle. In this case, though, the 
struggle is not for the Good, or the True, but for the condition of 
Writing. Eurydice will be symbolically identified with death, with the 
night, with the darkness that envelops her, and Orpheus with the 
alienated condition of the writer (and probably, by extension, with the 
condition of our modernity) the fulfillment of whose existential need can 
occur only from out of a tragic grappling with that darkness. The danger 
of such an allegory is that it might appear to turn Eurydice into a cipher, 
into a mere moment in the history of the becoming of Writing. This 
would imply an understanding of the (Feminine) presence of Eurydice as 
a mere waypoint toward a Romantic ideal of a ‘pure' (read Masculine) 
productivity. But such a quasi-Wagnerian reading would fail to do 
justice to the central complexity of Blanchot's interpretation. Crucially, 
in ‘Le Regard d'Orphée', it is not the pure pursuit of the ‘work' of 
writing, of rendering visible in words, that entails the tragic inevitability 
of the encounter with loss, with absence, represented by the loss of 
Eurydice: there is no sense here of an ‘overcoming' of a ‘temptation'. 
Rather, it is precisely the abandonment of the work, the refusal, 
exemplified in the turning of Orpheus, which paradoxically provides the 
core experience that enables the work to fulfill itself. Blanchot's 
radically new understanding of ‘inspiration' will thus reach beyond the 
identification of Eurydice with the passive ‘inspirational source' of 
Orpheus' lament, and instead locate the tragic inevitability of Orpheus' 
loss in a necessary refusal of the demands of the work. For Blanchot, 
there is no ‘failing' here, of the kind assumed by traditional readings of 
the story. The tragedy of Orpheus - our tragedy – lies not within the 
bounds of a dilemma of choice between the competing demands of 
sensual experience and the ‘work'. Rather, the pursuit of the work – of 
Writing – is understood as paradoxically dependent on the refusal, the 
rejection of that pursuit. The tragic condition of the writer is to be 
bound, like Sisyphus, to the pursuit of a project whose realization 
depends on its failure. 
‘Art', writes Blanchot, ‘is the power that causes the night to open'. It is 
the power that carries Orpheus' lament to the depths of Hell. But the 
purpose of his descent is the retrieval of Eurydice, thus understood as 
‘the profoundly dark point toward which art, desire, death, and the night 
all lead.' As such, and this is crucial to Blanchot's thinking, Eurydice is 
present within a network of concealments – the veiling of death, the 
impenetrability of her nocturnal habitus. It is towards her non-Being, 
towards her absence, that Orpheus sets his desire, his song. In this sense, 
Orpheus' gaze, which betrays the hope that brought him to Hell, yet 
remains faithful to this desire, in that what he is seeking is not ‘Eurydice 
in her diurnal truth', but precisely his beloved ‘in her nocturnal darkness, 
in her distance, her body closed, her face sealed….' What Orpheus 
seeks, then, is the night, not in a form which might be accessible to the 
realm of the visible, but ‘the other night', as Blanchot puts it, the night 
whose essence can be grasped only in its in visibility, in its concealment. 
His journey is thus locked into the paradox of a darkness whose truth 
can be made visible, articulated, revealed, only by betraying its nature as 
darkness – ‘Orpheus does not want to make her live, but to have the 
fullness of death living in her.' This desire indicates that the moment of 
transgression is not Orpheus' turning. Rather, it is the moment of his 
setting out upon his journey, the moment at which his desire becomes 
desire for the night, for the truth of Eurydice's absence. In thus moving 
into the arena of death, Orpheus must confront ‘the veiled presence 
which did not conceal her....infinite absence.' 
The gaze of Orpheus represents both betrayal and fulfillment. It is 
betrayal in that, in turning back, Orpheus ‘desires Eurydice beyond the 
measured limits of song' - the song which is his destiny, the song which 
is the means of Eurydice's becoming present. But it is also fulfillment, in 
that to grasp Eurydice's absence, to be within the essence of the night 
that envelops her and of which she is the symbol, he must refuse, must 
entirely abandon the project of her retrieval. 
‘To look at Eurydice without concern for the song, in the impatience and 
imprudence of a desire which forgets the law – this is inspiration ', 
writes Blanchot. It is, precisely, the moment of abandon which destroys 
the project it initiates, and unleashes the pain of irretrievable loss into a 
song which can only exist in the wake of that abandonment, eking a 
half-life among the debris of catastrophe, shedding the half-light of 
imaginative restoral on the vacancy of lost meaning. Orpheus' gaze, 
careless or deliberate, but initiated in either case by desire, is the 
catastrophe that entails the second loss, the loss of Eurydice that is also 
the loss of hope, the loss of the object of desire, and the loss of the 
‘essential night' the dream of whose reclamation first guides Orpheus 
toward the darkness of Hell. It is, in a very precise sense, ‘meaningless', 
because it must refuse the embrace of all that might lend it meaning. But 
for Blanchot, it thus also can be inspiration, in the sense that it is, 
paradoxically, only in the abandonment of this project that the profound 
absence of the loved object, and the inaccessibility of night, of darkness, 
of the death in which the loved object has her Being, can be rendered 
present . ‘It is…only in this gaze that the work can go beyond itself, 
unite with its origin and establish itself in impossibility.' Tortured by its 
failure, inspiration renders absence present, articulates the voice of 
impossible desire, and sings the very soul of darkness: 
  
‘… around this lament-world, even as 
around the other earth, a sun revolved 
and a silent star-filled heaven, a lament- 
heaven, with its own, disfigured stars…' 
  
II 
Beyond mythic invocation, beyond the allegorization and re-
actualization of an ancient and tragic tale, how is the enshrinement of 
mourning that takes place in Blanchot's text to be understood? How can 
the confrontation with loss come to be at the center of the experience of 
writing? To set tragic loss at the cornerstone of poetic and artistic 
expression must mean more than merely elevating the importance of a 
‘sad' or ‘mournful' character of certain works over their ‘joyful' 
contraries. Still less must such a theory be content with uncovering some 
kind of ‘concealed sadness' in otherwise ‘happy' expressions. It must 
look beyond the character, the mood of individual expressions, to locate 
absence, loss, void, at the very wellspring of imagination. It must 
establish the experience of loss as an originary one, as the meeting 
ground, the common source of imaginative expressions of ecstatic 
ebullience as much as those of an interiorized regret, of joyous 
affirmation as much as of tragic collapse. It would trace the lineaments 
of loss in the very fibres of imaginative production, and seek the 
melancholy shadows of absence in the fullness of creative exuberance. 
To serve such a function the loss, the absence, must needs be archaic, 
primitive, primal. Hence it is not entirely surprising to find the 
possibility of a theoretical support for Blanchot's meditation within the 
psychoanalytic arena – specifically in Kristeva's work on melancholy 
and imagination, ‘Black Sun' of 1987. 
Kristeva's work engages for the most part with openly melancholic 
expressions, with creative moments that explicitly foreground the 
depressive moments of the artist – of Holbein, of Nerval, of Dostoevsky 
– and her work aims at exploring the paradox of a sullen, depressive 
posture that, nonetheless, finds in imaginative production a voice, a 
means of articulating its heavy silence. But it is more than a description 
of the psychic situation of individual artists. ‘If there is no writing that is 
not amorous, there is no imagination which is not, overtly or secretly, 
melancholic,' she claims. And it is this claim of approach toward a 
‘secret melancholy' of imagination that brings her book beyond a ‘theory 
of depression' towards a re-thinking of the whole spectrum of 
imaginative experience. Such a thinking would locate, in the figure of 
archaic loss, ‘the ultimate thresholds of inscribable dislocation and 
jouissance ' , and its starting and ending-points would be her exhortation 
that, ‘rather than seek the meaning of despair…let us acknowledge that 
there is meaning only in despair' . 
Central to Kristeva's conception of imagination is her re-description of 
depression as a function of a narcissistic injury far more primitive, more 
primal, than more traditional notions of depression as internalized anger 
might allow. Where a traditional approach might see depression emerge 
out of a frustration, out of an inwardly-turned response to the 
ambivalence of a disappointed love, Kristeva discovers a depression 
beyond the possibility of reference to an object. Such a depressive 
psychic moment, such a sadness, would emerge from beyond the level at 
which symbolic representation can take place. Unreachable, because it 
precedes all the forms that might provide the means of its identification 
or recognition (words, images, etc.), such a moment, such a place (if 
these words can be used of a psychic area that precedes the possibility of 
either term) would not be retrievable in terms of the expression of a 
repressed anger. It would be, instead, an originary absence, for the 
description of which Kristeva has elsewhere invoked the Platonic ‘ 
Chora '. ‘In such a case,' she writes, ‘suicide is not a disguised act of 
war, but a merging with sadness, and beyond it, with that impossible 
love, never reached, always elsewhere…' 
If the libidinal investments of the traditional psychoanalytic subject aim 
at the recovery of a lost ‘ Object ', the Kristevan subject is oriented 
around the loss of a more primal construct that, invoking Heidegger as 
well as Lacan and Freud, she terms ‘the Thing '. ‘Inscribed within us 
without memory', the Thing is the irretrievably absent, the wellspring 
from which something like an ‘object of desire' can emerge. Lacan, 
reading Freud, similarly understands the Thing ( das Ding ) as ‘the 
subject's absolute Other…recovered, at best, in regret.' But where Lacan 
would retain the difficult centrality of the subject's relation to language 
in his or her engagement with this archaic otherness, Kristeva will insist 
on the cry as the primordial articulation of the anguish of the other, prior 
to its relation with all orders of symbolic representation. Lacking a 
relation even with a language that might express a refusal, a negation, a 
denial, the Thing as primal otherness emerges as the ‘borderline' of the 
self, the inexpressible limit within which, and out of which, the self is 
constituted. It is within this ‘fringe of strangeness' that forms of 
expression can start to emerge that, in their devotion to ambivalence of 
meaning, to a tangential relation with forms of literal representation, can 
begin to approach the articulation of this Otherness. Thus song, melody, 
rhythm, metaphor - the ‘semantic polyvalency' of the poetic - would 
have their force and origin not in relation to the discovery of esoteric 
‘higher truths', as Romantic aesthetics would have it, but in relation to a 
primal absence whose contours can be pointed to but never expressed: 
an absolute absence - Blanchot's ‘other night', the night of pure loss, of 
the utter irretrievability of the lost Eurydice. Eurydice - the hidden 
object of longing – would thus be the embodiment of the absolute other, 
inscribed within each of us as loss : the loss of the maternal object, of a 
primal wholeness, of a oneness the recapture of which becomes the 
overpowering goal of the sullen depressive, who can understand only in- 
significance in words, and find only in death the realization of his 
‘fantasy of untouchable fullness'. 
For Kristeva, the establishment of a system of symbolic representation – 
language, for instance – occurs from out of a denial of this primal loss. 
This denial is represented symbolically through the emergence of the 
father, whose ‘function is precisely to guarantee the establishment of the 
signifier.' Sadness, as mood, as affect, is the operation within the subject 
of the primal loss constituted as separation , in the first instance 
separation from the mother. Paradoxically, though, it is precisely this 
separation, this loss, which first enables the possibility of the formation 
of symbolic equivalence, of signifier, of sign: after all, as Kristeva points 
out, ‘a lack is necessary for the sign to emerge.' Writing, on this account, 
would be always at its core a tragic condition, saturated with the pain of 
a loss, a separation, whose denial is its very condition of possibility. The 
enactment of language in discourse would require, then, beyond (prior 
to) the supposition of a dialogic partner, a more archaic form of relation: 
a relation to the primal object. In speaking, in writing, in forming 
sentences, the subject is held in relation to primal loss in such a way that 
its absence is always also present in the lack for which symbol and sign 
struggle to compensate; and in the denial that gives them sway: ‘Our gift 
of speech, of situating ourselves in time for an other, could exist 
nowhere except beyond an abyss.' 
The dialogue with absence - the mourning of the primal loss - that 
language represents, is a process prone to a certain incompleteness. 
Noting the Greek sense of ‘metaphorein' as ‘to transport', Kristeva 
claims that ‘language is – from the start – a translation:' a mode of 
communication to which belongs, of necessity, the threat of inadequacy. 
It is in the interstices of this incomplete mourning that the desire 
emerges for a language ‘alien to itself', a language that stops in its tracks 
the flow of translation of primal affect, and turns back on itself to 
‘capture the unnameable' , to render present the loss. Such a language 
would dwell on rhythm, on sound, on the alliterative, on multiplicity and 
ambiguity of meaning. It would be a language that undercuts the 
stability of the signifier - the monolithic singularity of referent - to open 
up a space in which the blank absence of the lost Thing, its nothingness, 
might become palpable. It would be, in short, a poetic language: 
‘It is…the level of the imagination – the level of writing – which bears 
witness to the hiatus, the blank or spacing that constitutes death for the 
unconscious.' 
Occupying a space at the borders of the self, the language that seeks to 
address primal loss will always hover on the edge of collapse into non-
meaning. It will work always at the edge, at the limit, at the line of 
separation between word and cry, expressive speech and inarticulate 
shout. It will run the risk, always, of severing its connection with the 
father, and folding inward into a paroxysm of tears. Or further still, into 
the blank emptiness of silence: 
‘If I am no longer capable of translating or metaphorizing, I become 




‘Dessauer wondered “Whether the song might not be too sad, too 
melancholy?” Schubert replied: “ Do you know any happy music ?”' 
  
Schubert's question has long caused consternation among musicians. 
What might he mean by this, the composer whose music is always most 
intimately bound up with song , that curious ecstatic heightening of 
language that appears at some level always to express an elevation of the 
human? Whence, this insistence on melancholy? 
Wherefore is this rejection of the ‘happy' installed at the core of an 
oeuvre which does not in any way decline the expression of a radical 
ebullience, a wild joy? Too often explained by a simplistic recourse to a 
psychologistic interpretation that would contain the danger of the remark 
by referring to the composer's supposed ‘state-of-mind', Schubert's 
remark has rarely been treated with the absolute gravity it deserves. 
Perhaps, then, it is possible, in the light of Kristeva and Blanchot, finally 
to look with seriousness at Schubert's question, to release it from the 
margins of psychological disturbance, and, ignoring the proscription 
implied in its rhetorical form, to actually - tentatively - proffer an 
answer. 
In reading Kristeva, we have discovered in the poetic imagination a form 
of speaking which, in pushing against the tyranny of the literal, forces a 
breach in the circuit of signification, opening a chasm in which the 
shadowy form of a primal loss can be glimpsed. In this way language – 
and writing in particular – contains always within itself the seeds of a 
possible engagement with the absent Thing such that loss, and the 
melancholy that attends it, hangs over them like a sign of an incipient 
mortality. It is the negation of this loss that is revealed as the condition 
of intelligible utterance. The fate of a poetic discourse would be forever 
to hover on the brink of non-meaning, the beckoning of which is at once 
the subject's greatest fear, and his deepest desire. But in negotiating this 
precipice, a poetic language must turn back on itself to reflect its origin 
as pure sound : it must reclaim for itself the limits of language at the 
point at which the intelligible word collapses into the pure 
unintelligibility of the exclamation, of the cry. The medium of this 
reclamation will be the musical – the realm of phonic consonance and 
dissonance, of rhythm and form, the raw material of a language still 
connected with the symbolic artifice of its origins. And it will be always, 
above all, beauty – the beautiful - that provides, in its very transience, 
the concrete form of a resistance to the encroachment of a mortality that 
is at once its dark underside and its constant companion. 
Is it perhaps thus, that song can be understood? As a language which 
displaces the rhythms of everyday speech, which distorts their cadence, 
lifting them into a contact with their origin as pure sound, elevating them 
into a harmony, creating for them a new destiny as beauty ? And is it 
here, perhaps, that we can address Schubert's difficult and disturbing 
question… “ Do you know any happy music ?” It is Death, the dark 
handmaiden of Song, working its spectral presence into a sound whose 
sole line of defense is its beauty, the evanescent glimmer of hope on the 
threshold of a silence which is its absolute origin, and to which it must, 
in the end, return. 
------------ 
Orpheus sings the loss of Eurydice. But not merely is it the loss of his 
beloved companion that he mourns. The song of Orpheus is, in its very 
being, riven by absence, shot through with longing, with loss, such that, 
for the song, Eurydice's death is the mere progression, the extension, of 
an otherness that already belonged to her living presence. Otherness 
walks with the song, it is its belonging, its home. Thus, as Blanchot 
understood, the pursuit of Eurydice into death is not the project of the 
wresting from darkness of a living being. It is the pursuit, even unto the 
depths of hell, of the lack, of the absence that frames always in advance 
the living essence of the beautiful, of the beloved. Song is the space in 
which originary loss intrudes on the visible, on the diurnal. Stretched 
across the divide of meaning and word, word and sound, sound and 
silence, song threads its way through the passage between primal 
separation - the ‘ other night' of Blanchot's text – and the visible, the 
expressible, the shared . The journey into Hades, in that sense, is the 
song of Orpheus, and the glance back toward Eurydice not a chance and 
tragic error. It is a response to the call of primal loss, of primal object: a 
response that understands that it is only in absolute inaccessibility that 
absence can be encountered; a response situated within the song, as its 
very condition of utterance. Orpheus cannot refuse the backward glance 
toward his beloved. He must turn, because he has always already done 
so . 
And yet, as Blanchot knew, there is, in this sudden glance, the seed of 
something other than loss, other than the embrace of absolute night. For 
Blanchot, Orpheus' act is inspiration, and is so exactly as a forgetting, as 
an abandonment. The gaze, in which the careful project of retrieval is at 
once jettisoned and absolutely fulfilled, has nonetheless within itself – 
perhaps in its very suddenness - a moment of refusal. It is the 
catastrophic incaution of a gesture that rejects the purposive . Refusing, 
if only momentarily, the demands of the law, Orpheus' glance is an 
outrageous abandonment of the meaningful. It does indeed lead 
Eurydice into a second loss, into the absolute irretrievability of death. 
But in its very refusal, in the radicality of its desire – perhaps even in its 
failure – one discerns the seeds of a hope. A hope that originary loss, the 
separation that haunts our dreams and our loves, might finally be 
extinguished in something other than the embrace of death: that we 
might, after all, find our way back to a lived experience of 
uncompromised meaning, of beauty…and of joy: 
  
‘It happened as he expected. He turned his head 
And behind him on the path was no one. 
  
Sun. And sky. And in the sky white clouds. 
Only now everything cried to him: Eurydice! 
How will I live without you, my consoling one! 
But there was a fragrant scent of herbs, the low humming of bees, 
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